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Abstract
A disturbing feature of the conventional objective function for intertemporal
decisions under uncertainty is that the agent’s attitudes toward intertemporal
substitution and risk aversion are entangled. This paper shows that, in contrast
to common perception, the two attitudes can be completely disentangled under
the expected utility theorem (EUT) by modeling each of them successively in
two steps. The conventional form is nested as a special case where the functions
describing the two attitudes are identical. The proposed framework requires
only the standard axioms of the EUT, in addition to a regulatory assumption.
It is flexible in accommodating diﬀerent combinations of the two attitudes,
indiﬀerent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty, intuitive to interpret, and
extendable to multiple goods.
The objective function under the proposed framework is time inconsistent
according to Strotz’s (1955) definition. I argue that Strotz’s notion of time
consistency is misguided. It is constructed based on a priori assumption that
the agent should continuously forget history as time progresses, which means
the agent is either chronically amnesiac or self-contradictory. To be truly con-
sistent, the agent should have one and only one objective function, determined
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at birth, throughout his entire life. As history unfolds, the agent updates his
information set, but not his objective function.
KEYWORS: Intertemporal substitution; Risk aversion; Expected utility
theorem; Time consistency; Equity premium puzzle
JEL Classifications: D81, D91, E21, G12
1 Introduction
The conventional objective function for intertemporal decisions under uncertainty
takes the form of conditional expectation of sum of discounted period utilities. A
disturbing feature of this setup is that the agent’s attitudes toward intertemporal
substitution and risk aversion are both dictated by the concavity of the period utility
function, and hence tied. For instance, under the power utility form, the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion is constrained to be the reciprocal of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution. There is no reason to believe that this relationship should
necessarily hold. Using survey data, Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997) find
no significant relationship, either statistically or economically, between the two at-
titudes. On the empirical front, there are a number of unresolved issues associated
with the conventional specification, probably the best known one being the equity
premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985). The puzzle concerns the inability of the
conventional model to explain the large premium of returns of stocks over (nominally)
riskless bonds over the long term without postulating an implausibly high degree of
risk aversion. The puzzle prevails in not only the US but also other countries. Kreps
and Porteus (1978), generalized by Epstein and Zin (1989), and Selden (1978) propose
non-expected utility specifications that disentangle the relationship.
This paper shows that, in contrast to common perception, the expected utility
theorem (EUT) is not to be blamed for the link. Actually, we can separate the two
attitudes under the EUT by using a simple, axiomatic two-step approach. First, every
possible consumption sequence outcome is translated into its constancy equivalent,
defined as the consumption level that, if maintained throughout lifetime, will leave
the agent indiﬀerent. Next, interpreting the lotteries over consumption sequences as
lotteries over constancy equivalents (scalars), we apply the EUT to the latter. The
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resulting expected utility determines the preference ordering among the lotteries. In
eﬀect, each lottery is translated into a degenerate and constant sequence (whose
constant level is called its constancy-equivalent) that is equally desirable. We then
only need to the compare the constancy-certainty equivalents of lotteries in order to
rank them. The attitudes toward intertemporal substitution and risk aversion are
encoded in the two steps independently, and therefore "cleanly" disentangled.
The conventional specification is nested as a special case where the preference
under certainty is time-separable and the functions describing the two attitudes are
identical. The proposed framework requires only the standard axioms of the EUT,
in addition to the assumption that the agent is indiﬀerent if the lotteries over con-
sumption sequence are replaced by the lotteries over the corresponding constancy
equivalents. The framework is flexible in accommodating diﬀerent combinations of
the two attitudes, indiﬀerent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty, and intuitive
to interpret. The framework can also be easily extended to accommodate multiple
goods.
I will address the issue of time consistency of the objective function under the
proposed framework in detail. Ever since Strotz (1955), an agent’s objective func-
tion is viewed as time inconsistent if, when he arrive at a certain period, his current
preference over his remaining-life consumptions (or lotteries of consumptions under
uncertainty) diﬀers from his retrospective preference (i.e. what his preference over
the same remaining life would have been had he been able to foresee the future).
From this perspective, the objective functions under the framework presented in this
paper is time inconsistent. I argue that Strotz’s notion of time inconsistency is mis-
guided. Specifically, the "current" preference is not valid - it is constructed based on
a priori assumption that the agent should continuously modify his objective function
by discarding history as time progresses. But this means the agent is either amnesiac
or self-contradictory. For instance, if the agent in period 0 cared about intertemporal
substitution between period-0 consumption c0 and future consumptions, then why is
c0 forgotten in period 1? To be truly consistent, the agent should have one and only
one objective function, determined at birth, throughout his entire life. As history
unfolds, the agent updates his information set, but not his objective function. The
agent always cares about his full-life instead of just the remaining-life because, as
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Stroz recognizes, history can influence future decision.
Accordingly, empirical problems could arise from two sources. First, the attitudes
toward intertemporal substitution and risk aversion are not properly disentangled;
second, the objective function fails to cover full-life consumption sequence. In partic-
ular, the equity premium puzzle is a key empirical issue for investigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
framework. Section 3 illustrates the framework with explicit functional forms, discuss
its features and assumptions, and extend it to accommodiate multiple goods. Section
4 addresses the issue of time consistency. Section 5 concludes.
2 Two-Step Approach of Disentanglement
Consider a rational agent who is just born in period 0, and will live until period T
under uncertainty.1 There is a single consumption good c. The conventional objective
function takes the form:
E0
TX
t=0
βtu¨(ct) (1)
where {ct}Tt=0 is a consumption sequence (a random vector), u¨ is strictly increasing, β
is the discount factor, and Et represents the expectation operator conditional on all
information available to the agent in period t. The specification is simple, tractable,
and intuitive, which probably accounts for its common use. Its use can be dated back
to as early as Beckmann (1959), who uses the dynamic programming form. Phelps
(1962) adopts (1) explicitly and explains:
This model postulates a consumer who obeys the axioms of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory.
.... [T]he individual .... is strictly averse to risk (concavity) .... [F]or
every pair of consumption histories (c1, ..., cN) and (co1, ..., coN) to which he
is not indiﬀerent, he will strictly prefer the certainty of the compromise
history θc + (1 − θ)co to the mixed prospect oﬀering him the history c
1I will only consider the preference in period 0 (birth) in this section in order to avoid for the
moment the issue of time consistency, which I will address in Section 4. T can be finite or infinite.
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with probability θ and the history co with probability 1− θ, 0 < θ < 1. It
follows trivially that u(cn) is a ... strictly concave function.
Presumably, by simply adding a conditional expectation operator to the lifetime
utility used in non-random models, both intertemporal substitution (variation aver-
sion2) and risk aversion are taken care of by the concavity of u¨ (u in the above
quotation). The profession seems to have accepted that the conventional specifica-
tion is a result of applying the EUT. An often cited drawback is that the preferences
on intertemporal substitution and risk aversion cannot be separated because they
both are dictated by u¨. For example, if u¨ takes the power utility form, then the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is constrained to be the reciprocal of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution.
Another way of viewing the restriction is as follows. For convenience, consider
discrete probability distributions. Under the time-separable objective function, given
any lottery, the agent would be indiﬀerent if we swap any subsequence of consumption
in one state with the corresponding subsequence in any other state with equal proba-
bility.3 For instance, in a two-period setting, the agent would be indiﬀerent between a
lottery of consumption outcomes (H,H), (L,L) with equal probabilities, and a lottery
of (H,L), (L,H) also with equal probabilities, where H > L. Intuitively, the second
lottery have higher variation across lifetime (both outcomes have a H and a L), but
is less risky (will not end up with either H in both periods or L in both periods)
than the first one. The two factors always exactly oﬀset with each other, leaving the
agent indiﬀerent. The problem with this result is that the agent presumably make
decision based on his full-life consumption sequence as a whole, instead of strands of
subsequences in isolation. Whenever an objective function is time-separable, there is
a cause for concern.
Before starting to disentangle the two attitudes under the EUT, it is helpful to
restate what the EUT exactly says. When applied to temporal consumption decisions,
the outcomes are sequences of consumptions {ct}Tt=0 ≡ c , rather than a single good or
monetary reward as in the static case. Preferences are defined on the space of lotteries,
2I will contrast variation aversion with fluctuation aversion in Section 3.2.
3More generally, consider some probability mass being swapped even if the states do not have
the same probability.
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each of which specifies a probability distribution of consumption sequences. The
EUT claims that if the preference satisfies the axioms of completeness, transitivity,
continuity and independence, then it can be represented by the expected utility form.
Specifically, there exists a real valued function w (the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function) defined over the realizations of consumption sequences such that the
preference can be represented by
E0w(c) (2)
The agent’s attitudes toward intertemporal substitution and risk aversion are both
embedded in w, which is unique up to positive aﬃne transformations.
Note that the EUT is concerned only with the existence of w; it tells us nothing
about how to postulate w. While the conventional specification (1) does take an
expected utility form, there is no compelling reason to adopt it immediately. In fact,
by doing so, we necessarily tie the two attitudes together. The tie is not a result of the
EUT itself, but a consequence of unsatisfactory postulation of w. Indeed, conceptually
none of the EUT axioms (or any combination of them) seems to necessarily lead to
the tie.
2.1 Constancy Equivalent
Instead of attempting to postulate w directly, I use a two-step approach. We already
know well how to apply the EUT to scalar outcomes such as monetary amounts.
When the outcomes are consumption sequences, however, we can first translate each
of them into a cardinal scalar index that measures its desirability. Then we can apply
the EUT to this index in the familiar fashion. The index we are going to use is called
the constancy equivalent as defined below.
In the first step, consider the outcomes in deterministic environment. The pref-
erence over consumption sequences under certainty describes the agent’s attitude
towards intertemporal substitution and time discounting. A more variation-averse
agent is more reluctant to substitute between time. A more impatient agent values
future consumptions less. For each outcome, we can define its constancy equivalent
as the consumption level that, if maintained throughout lifetime, will leave the agent
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indiﬀerent.
Definition 1 (Constancy Equivalent) Given a preference under certainty repre-
sented by U : RT+1+ → R, for any non-random consumption sequence c ∈RT+1+ , its
constancy equivalent c∈R+ is the consumption level that leaves the agent indiﬀer-
ent between c and the constant consumption sequence c ≡ {c}Tt=0, i.e. U(c) =U(c).
Also, call c the constancy equivalent sequence of c.
No restriction on the preference under certainty is imposed as long as c exists for
any c.4 Although the preference under certainty can take many diﬀerent forms, the
following time-separable form is often specified:
U(c) =
TX
t=0
βtu(ct) (3)
where the period utility function u is strictly increasing and (if the agent is variation-
averse) strictly concave, and the discount factor is β. The constancy equivalent of c
is given by c such that
TX
t=0
βtu(c) =
TX
t=0
βtu(ct)
or
c = u−1
Ã
1− β
1− βT+1
TX
t=0
βtu(ct)
!
(4)
2.2 Constancy Equivalence EUT
In the second step we move to the stochastic environment. In doing so, we need
to assume that constancy equivalence carries over to the stochastic environment.
Specifically, we make the constancy indiﬀerence assumption: given any lottery of
consumption sequences, the agent is indiﬀerent if the consumption sequence c in
each outcome is replaced by its constancy equivalent sequence c. By virtue of this
constancy indiﬀerence assumption, we can convert the problem of choosing between
lotteries of consumption sequences into one of choosing between lotteries of constancy
equivalents. We can therefore apply the EUT with the constancy equivalents treated
4A preference that fails this requirement is the lexicographic preference.
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as outcomes. By the EUT, there exists a function v such that the preference can be
represented by E0v(c). Formally,5
Lemma 2 (Constancy Equivalence EUT) Suppose that the constancy indiﬀer-
ence assumption hold. If a preference on the space of lotteries of consumption se-
quences satisfies the completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence axioms,
then there exists a constancy equivalence von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function v : R+ → R such that the preference in period 0 can be represented by the
objective function
E0v(c) (5)
where c denotes the constancy equivalent.
The theorem is a specialization of the orginal dynamic EUT (2), where w is
defined jointly by U and v. The theorem and v are so named to distinguish them
from the original dynamic EUT and w. The function v is defined on constancy
equivalents, whereas w on consumption sequences. If all lotteries are degenerate, then
(5) represents exactly the same preference as the preference under certainty. Notice
that v, with certainty equivalent as the argument, describes risk aversion toward full-
life consumption as a whole. Contrast this with the conventional specification, where
u¨ concerns risk aversion toward single period lotteries.
If the preference under certainty takes the time-separable form (3), then w is
defined jointly by u, v and β. Any outcome of consumption sequence is translated to
its constancy equivalent by u and β, which then contribute to the objective function by
mapping through v. The agent’s attitude towards intertemporal substitution and risk
are represented by u and v respectively, and hence they are cleanly separated. In the
special case where u = v, (5) is equivalent to the familiar conventional specification
(just substitute (4) into (5)). Note that even when the preference under certainty is
time-separable, the objective function is not in general.
Corresponding to the notions of certainty equivalent and risk premium in the
static setting, we can define their counterparts in the dynamic environment:
5Strictly speaking, the theorem only requires the EUT axioms to hold for the lotteries on certainty
equivalent sequences, rather than for the lotteries on all consumption sequences. But the more
general assumption appears to be a more natural one to make. In addition, it guarantees the
existence of constancy equivalents.
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Definition 3 (Certainty-constancy Equivalent) Given a lottery on consumption
sequences, define its certainty-constancy equivalent bc as the non-random scalar
such that the agent is indiﬀerent between the lottery and a degenerate constant con-
sumption sequence bc ≡ {bc}Tt=0 .
Under the general form of dynamic EUT (2), w(bc) = E0w (c). Under the con-
stancy equivalence EUT (5), bc is simply the certainty equivalent of the random c:
v(bc) = E0v(c).
The scalar bc can be viewed as a lottery’s summary score that incorporates all
aspects of the agent’s preference under temporal stochastic environment. Hence the
agent chooses whichever lottery that yields the highest bc.
Definition 4 (Variation Premium, Risk Premium and Risk-variation Premium)
Given a lottery on consumption sequences, the variation premium pv ≡ E0(c) −
E0(c), the risk premium pr ≡ E0(c) − bc, and the risk-variation premium
prv ≡ E0(c)− bc.
Therefore, pv is the sequence of period-by-period diﬀerences between the expected
value of consumption under the lottery and that of the variation-free (but uncertain)
c. Intuitively, pv is the expected value of consumption that the agent is willing to
sacrifice in order to get rid of variations within any outcome of consumption sequence.
Similarly, pr is the expected value of consumption that the agent is willing to sacrifice
in order to further get rid of uncertainty. prv is simply the sum of the two: the
expected value to be sacrificed in order to get rid of both variation and uncertainty.
Figure 1 illustrates the constancy-equivalence EUT for the simple case of two pe-
riods (0 and 1) and a lottery of two outcomes (A and B) with equal probabilities. The
bottom panel shows the indiﬀerence curves (ICA and ICB) associated with the two
outcomes under certainty. Because of discounting of period 1 utility, the indiﬀerence
curves are not symmetric around the 45 ◦ line. The constancy equivalents cA and cB
are given by the intersections between the indiﬀerence curves and the 45 ◦ line. The
constancy equivalents are then mapped to v(cA) and v(cB) in the top panel, from
where we can find E0v(c) and thus the certainty-constancy equivalent bc. Any lottery
can be mapped to its certainty-constancy equivalent in a similar fashion. This is how
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the lotteries are ranked. The preference under certainty is shaped by U in the bottom
panel, whereas the risk attitude is dictated by v in the top panel.
The agent is indiﬀerent between the lottery (A,B) and the lottery (A¯, B¯) by
virtue of the constancy indiﬀerence assumption, and also the degenerate-and-constant
sequence denoted by Cˆ. M is the midpoint of A and B, whereas M¯ is the midpoint
of A¯ and B¯. Then pv is the vector pointing from M¯ to M , pr from Cˆ to M¯ , and prv
from Cˆ to M .
We can also see from Figure 1 why the conventional specification is recovered
when u = v (assuming the time-separable form for the preference under certainty).
If u and v coincides, then we can replace v by u in the top panel. E0v(c) becomes
E0u(c) = 12u(cA)+
1
2
u(cB), which equals 12 [u(cA0) + βu(cA1)]+
1
2
[u(cB0) + βu(cB1)] by
definition of constancy equivalent. Thus the conventional specification is recovered.
3 Discussion
This section illustrates the constancy equivalence EUT framework with explicit func-
tional forms, discuss its features and assumptions, and extend it to accommodiate
multiple goods.
3.1 Explicit Functional Forms
The functional forms for U and v are flexible. For instance, an agent can have Leontief
preference for U and linear preference for v. However, for illustration, I assume the
time-separable form for the preference under certainty, and specify the functional
forms of u and v as follows. Suppose u takes the constant elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (CEIS) form:
u(c) =
(
c1−σ/(1− σ) if σ ≥ 0, σ 6= 1
log(c) if σ = 1
where 1/σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption sequences
under certainty. Meanwhile, v takes the form of constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA):
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v(c) =
(
c1−ρ/(1− ρ) if ρ ≥ 0, ρ 6= 1
log(c) if ρ = 1
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for lotteries of constancy equivalents.
The parameter ρ should be interpreted as measuring risk aversion toward lifetime
consumptions.
The attitudes toward intertemporal substitution and risk aversion are determined
independently by σ and ρ respectively. Suppose σ, ρ 6= 1, then
c =
"
1− β
1− βT+1
Ã
TX
t=0
βtc1−σt
!# 1
1−σ
the objective function (5) becomes (dropping the positive term
³
1−β
1−βT+1
´ 1−ρ
1−σ
)6
E0
⎡
⎣ 1
1− ρ
Ã
TX
t=0
βtc1−σt
! 1−ρ
1−σ
⎤
⎦ (6)
The familiar conventional specification for power utility form is recovered when σ = ρ.
To the extent that σ and ρ are diﬀerent, using the conventional objective function
would cause significant departure from observed data, and thus lead to empirical
issues. Also notice that even though the preference under certainty is time-separable,
the objective function is not, unless σ = ρ.
If the agent is variation-neutral (σ = 0), then (6) becomes
E0
⎡
⎣ 1
1− ρ
Ã
TX
t=0
βtct
!1−ρ⎤
⎦
In this case, all that the agent cares ex post is the discounted sum of consumptions
TP
t=0
βtct. Ex ante, the agent maximizes the conditional expectation of v of the dis-
counted sum in accordance with the EUT.
6Also, cˆ =
⎧
⎨
⎩E0
⎧
⎨
⎩
∙
1−β
1−βT+1
µ
TP
t=0
βtc1−σt
¶¸ 1−ρ
1−σ
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎫
⎬
⎭
1
1−ρ
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On the other hand, if the agent is risk-neutral (ρ = 0), then (6) becomes
E0
⎡
⎣
Ã
TX
t=0
βtc1−σt
! 1
1−σ
⎤
⎦
One may wonder why the objective function does not reduce to the conventional form
even when the agent is risk-neutral. The answer is that the agent cares about the full-
life consumption sequence as a whole. If the objective function were time-separable,
then we are ignoring the variations of consumptions within each outcome; the agent
would be indiﬀerent if we swap a subsequence of consumption in one state with the
corresponding subsequence in any other state with equal probability. But this result
contradicts with the premise that the agent is variation-averse.
3.2 Features and Assumptions
The constancy indiﬀerence assumption postulates that the agent facing a lottery is
indiﬀerent if each outcome (a full-life consumption sequence) is now replaced by the
corresponding constancy equivalent sequence. Suppose the lottery were drawn right
now and the outcome were revealed completely to the agent, then by definition of con-
stancy equivalent the agent is indiﬀerent between the realized consumption sequence
and the constancy equivalent sequence. However, in reality the complete outcome is
not known until the agent dies. Hence the constancy indiﬀerence assumption can be
understood as indiﬀerence to early resolution of uncertainty.7
If the agent does not care whether the uncertainty is resolved early, then the
constancy indiﬀerence assumption is satisfied. Together with the other axioms, the
constancy equivalence EUT says that the preference can be represented by (5), which
itself implies indiﬀerence to early resolution.8
Therefore the constancy-equivalence EUT is logically coherent with respect to
the constancy indiﬀerence assumption: If we assume indiﬀerence to early resolution,
7Indiﬀerence to early resolution can be understood intuitively as follow. Suppose the agent is
informed that the entire consumption sequence will be revealed later today, the agent is neither more
nor less happy before the revelation.
8(5) is already conditioned on currently available information; taking expectation conditional on
currently available information again makes no diﬀerence.
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then we get a preference representation that does conform with this property. So
indiﬀerence to early resolution is a feature of the EUT framework.
Sure enough, the EUT itself is not without controversy regardless of the constancy
indiﬀerence assumption.9 The independence axiom in particular is subject to much
scrutiny. This paper makes no attempt to investigate this topic. However, the frame-
work developed here refutes the line of arguments against the EUT that is based on
the perceived link between intertemporal substitution and risk aversion.
Another assumption made in the specification is that T (if finite) is known. While
this assumption by itself is unrealistic, the potential problem could be mitigated by
interpreting β as not just reflecting impatience, but also uncertainty of when the life
ends.
Next, it would be worthwhile to distinguish between variation aversion and fluctu-
ation aversion. For the preference under certainty, the time-separable form addresses
only impatience and variation aversion. In the absence of discounting, the agent is
indiﬀerent between any permutation of a consumption sequence. For instance, the
agent is indiﬀerent if a consumption sequence consisting of L for the first half and
H > L for the second is replaced by a sequence in which H and L alternates. The
agent cares about variations in quantities, but not the period-by-period fluctuations
per se.
In contrast, under the habit formation models (for example, Constantinides, 1990;
Campbell and Cochrane, 1995), the agent does care about how the consumption se-
quence is ordered even in the absence of discounting. In principle, the constancy
equivalence EUT framework can allow habit formation and order dependence. There
is no restriction on the preference under certainty as long as constancy equivalent
exists. Also notice that the attitudes toward variations and fluctuations are sensitive
to the choice of length of period in discrete models. For instance, a sequence alter-
nating between H and L will be completely flat if we double the length of time in
each period. Variations and fluctuations within a period are ignored.
Finally, in the two-step approach we eliminate variation in the first step and risk
in the second. One may wonder whether we could reverse the procedure, i.e. to
eliminate risk first and then variation next. A natural way to proceed would be as
9See Starmer (2000) for a survey of non-expected utility theories.
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follows. Given a lottery, find the certainty equivalent consumption for each period
separately. (Note that the risk attitude could vary across periods.) We thus arrive
at a degenerate but non-constant consumption sequence, which we then "smoothen"
into a degeneate constant sequence according to the agents attitude toward variation
aversion. Unfortuantely, this approach is not only more complicated, but also wrong.
In reducing a lottery of diﬀerent outcomes into a sequence of certainty equivalents
period-by-period, we are treating each period as isolated objects and therefore lose
the intertemporal relationship within each outcome. The mistake is similar to the
one made in the conventional objective function.
3.3 Extension to Multiple Goods
We can easily generalize the constancy equivalent EUT framework to accommo-
date multiple goods. A leading application is the labor supply decision where the
agent chooses leisure as well as income consumptions. Another example is macroe-
conomic models that distinguish between durable and non-durable goods. In gen-
eral, suppose there are N goods and the preference under certainty is represented
by U : R(T+1)×N+ → R. For any non-random sequence of consumption bundles
x = {x1t, x2t, ..., xNt}Tt=0 where xit denotes the consumption of good i in period t,
define its constancy equivalent x¯ by the following relationship:
U(x) = U(x¯)
where x¯ = {x¯, x¯, ..., x¯}Tt=0. In other words, the agent is indiﬀerent if the consumption
level of each good in each period becomes x¯ invariably. As long as the constancy
indiﬀerence assumption together with the axioms of the EUT hold, we can rank the
lotteries over the sequences of multiples goods by E0v(x¯), or equivalently by the
certainty constancy equivalent xˆ defined by v(xˆ) = E0v(x¯).
In picking the units of measurements for the diﬀerent goods, it is advisable to
make "sensible" choices such that the equality of number of units of all goods would
seem plausible. For example, if the typical worker earn about $40,000 by working
for about 2,000 hours (i.e. 6,760 leisure hours) per year. Then we could choose to
measure leisure in hours and income consumption in six dollars. The advantage of
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picking commensurate units of measurement is twofold. First, it helps avoid reaching
constraints such as maximum number of hours available for leisure. Second, typically
the utility function is intended to describe trade-oﬀ relationship between goods for
the regions of realistic consumption levels.
There remains the question of specifying U . As an example, a typical functional
form involving two goods — non-durables (c) and durables (d) — is
U(c,d) =
TX
t=0
βt [γ log ct + (1− γ) log dt]
However, in light of the theme of this paper, one may be concerned with the entan-
gling of attitutdes toward intertemporal substitution (across time) and intratemporal
substitution (across contemporaneous goods). According to the above preference,
in the absence of discounting, it does not matter which c and d is paired in each
period, as long as the entire (unordered) set {ct, dt}Tt=0 remains the same. For in-
stance, in a two-period setting, a sequence of {(cH , dH) , (cL, dL)} is just as desirable
as {(cH , dL) , (cL, dH)}. The intratemporal substitution / complementarity relation-
ship between c and d is mixed with intertemporal relationship.
In light of the two-step approach, a three-step approach in the similar spirit can
be applied here to disentangle the intertemporal, intratemporal and risk attitudes al-
together. First, for each outcome, convert the consumption bundle {x1t, x2t, ..., xNt} in
each period t into its period-specific constancy equivalent x¯t given by p (x1t, x2t, ..., xNt) =
p (x¯t, x¯t, ..., x¯t), where p dictates the intratemporal attitude. (Here I assume that ther
intratemporal attitude is the same across time, so that we need only one p.) Next,
make the period-specific constancy indiﬀerence assumption: that the agent is indif-
ferent if the consumption bundle in each period of a sequence is replaced by its
period-specific constancy equivalent bundle. In other words, x = {x1t, x2t, ..., xNt}Tt=0
is as preferred as {x¯t, x¯t, ..., x¯t}Tt=0. We can then translate the whole consumption
sequence x into its constancy equivalent x¯ such that q (x¯0, x¯1, ..., x¯T ) = q (x¯, x¯, ..., x¯),
where q represents the intertemporal attitude as well as discounting. Finally, in mov-
ing to the stochastic environment, make the constancy indiﬀerence assumption and
apply the constancy equivalence EUT.
In essence, U is defined jointly by p and q. The three steps take care of intratem-
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poral substitution, intertemporal substitution, and risk aversion successively. As an
illustration, assume constant elasticities 1/θ and 1/σ for the two substitutions respec-
tively, and constant relative risk aversion of coeﬃcient ρ for lotteries on constancy
equivalents, i.e.10
p (x1t, x2t, ..., xNt) =
NX
i=1
x1−θit
1− θ
q (x¯0, x¯1, ..., x¯T ) =
TX
t=0
βt
x¯1−σt
1− σ
v (x¯) =
x¯1−ρ
1− ρ
then it is straightforward to show that the objective function takes the form of (with
some positive constant terms dropped)11
E0
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
1− ρ
⎡
⎣
TX
t=0
βt
Ã
NX
i=1
x1−θit
! 1−σ
1−θ
⎤
⎦
1−ρ
1−σ
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
Finally, I leave the issues of (i) whether it is important to disentangle the intratem-
poral and intertemporal attitudes, and (ii) whether it is necessary to define an even
more nuanced intratemporal relationship between various goods (rather than relying
on a single parameter such as θ above) as empirical questions.
4 Time Consistency
Strotz (1955) establishes the notion of time consistency, which has been adopted by
the profession ever since:
An individual is imagined to choose a plan of consumption for a future
period of time so as to maximize the utility of the plan as evaluated at
10Each of the functions take the log form when the relevant parameter (θ, σ, ρ) is 1.
11Also, the certainty-constancy equivalent xˆ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
E0
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
⎡
⎣ 1−β
1−βT+1
TP
t=0
βt
µ
1
N
NP
i=1
x1−θit
¶ 1−σ
1−θ
⎤
⎦
1−ρ
1−σ
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
1
1−ρ
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the present moment.... Our problem arises when we ask: If he is free
to reconsider his plan at later dates, will he abide by it or disobey it
— even though his original expectations of future desires and means of
consumption are verified? Our answer is that the optimal plan of the
present moment is generally one which will not be obeyed, or that the
individual’s future behavior will be inconsistent with his optimal plan.
According Strotz’s definition, the objective function under the constancy equiva-
lence EUT framework is time inconsistent in general. I will argue that this definition
of time consistency is misguided. Strotz’s presumption that the agent should max-
imize the utility of the plan "as evaluated at the present moment" means that the
agent keep modifying his "current" objective function by discarding history as time
progress. Actually, the creation of the "current" objective function implies the agent
is either amnesiac or self-contradictory. To be truly consistent, the agent should have
one and only one objective function, determined at birth, throughout his lifetime. As
history unfolds, the agent updates his information set, but not his objective function.
The agent always cares about his full-life instead of just the remaining-life because,
as Stroz and other researchers recognize, history can influence future decision.
In this section, I first motivate the issue by laying out Epstein and Zin’s (1989)
concern on time inconsistency in the context of the constancy equivalence EUT frame-
work. I then argue that the concern is misguided. With this perspective, I contend
that it is the class of objective functions defined on remaining-life, which includes all
recursively defined objective functions, that is indeed incoherent.
4.1 The Concern for Time Inconsistency
The constancy equivalence EUT objective function is reminiscent of Kihlstrom and
Mirman’s (1974) approach in that it maps the random variable (c in this case) through
the function v before taking expectation in order to account for risk aversion. Epstein
and Zin (1989, pp. 950-952) caution that when applied to the temporal environment,
the Kihlstrom-Mirman approach would result in time inconsistency. To see the con-
cern, consider an agent who arrives at period R. According to Strotz, his updated
objective function should now be
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E [vR(cR) | IR]
where IR is the set of all information that the agent possesses in period R.12
On the other hand, suppose that the agent’s consumption history is (c˙0, c˙1, ..., c˙R−1)
and he contemplates his decision in period 0 retrospectively. In period 0, had he been
able to tell the future (i.e. know IR completely, which includes among other things his
information in period 0 and his consumption history (c˙0, c˙1, ..., c˙R−1) to be realized),
his objective function in period 0 would have been
E [v0(c0) | IR]
where c0 is calculated partly based on deterministic values (c˙0, c˙1, ..., c˙R−1).
The concern is that since v is not linear in general, the two objective functions
could result in diﬀerent preferences. To see this more clearly, consider the CEIS-
CRRA form. The two objective functions become13
E
⎡
⎣ 1
1− ρ
Ã
TX
t=R
βt−Rc1−σt
! 1−ρ
1−σ
| IR
⎤
⎦
for the "current" problem and
E
⎡
⎣ 1
1− ρ
Ã
R−1X
s=0
βsc˙1−σs +
TX
t=R
βtc1−σt
! 1−ρ
1−σ
| IR
⎤
⎦
for the retrospective problem. The two objective functions would represent diﬀerent
preferences for the lottery on consumption sequences (cR, cR+1, ..., cT ), hence resulting
in time inconsistency. The agent may prefer one lottery over another today, but
he would have chosen the opposite yesterday (even with foresight of what would
happen today).14 Moreover, the result is not restricted to the time-separable form of
12The function v is subscripted with the time period to allow for finite life: The risk aversion
toward remaining full-life consumption can depend on how long the remaining life is. Similarly, the
formula for c depends on the length of the remaining life.
13Assume for simplicity that σ and ρ do not change with the length of remaining life.
14The issue can be analyzed equivalently by a prospective rather than retrospective thought ex-
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preference under certainty.
4.2 Full-life versus Remaining-life Objective Functions
Having laid out the issue, now I argue that it is a misguided concern. While the
retrospective objective function is valid, the current one is not. As the profession
recognize, the objective function can be history-dependent in general. This brings us
back to the recurring message of this paper on intertemporal choices: Agents care
about full-life consumption sequence beginning with period 0 (when he was born) as
a whole, not just the remaining life, or any other subsequence. History is history, but
history still matters because the agent cares about his full-life consumption sequence
as a whole. For instance, if past consumptions have been low, the agent would be less
averse to lotteries that entail relatively low level but also less risky future consumption,
as compared to another situation where past consumptions have been high. This is
because low future consumptions would mean high full-life variations for the latter
situation but relatively low variations for the former.15 Without forgetting history,
the objective function is always
E
⎡
⎣ 1
1− ρ
Ã
TX
t=0
βtc1−σt
! 1−ρ
1−σ
| ID
⎤
⎦ (7)
throughout the lifetime. ID is the set of all information available to the agent, which
contains, among other information, consumption history up to period D − 1.16
It should be clear from (7) that the only source of change for the agent’s preference
is due to changes in the prevailing information set ID. The agent periodically update
his preference and plan with new information. But a consistent agent never update
the objective function itself. Even equipped with the current (period D) information
set, his objective function still takes the form of (7).
Except for rare situations, the agent’s information set has to change with time, for
periment: Suppose now is period 0, and the agent look forward to his decision in period R given the
consumption history to be realized and the future information set.
15The general idea of history dependence should not be confused with the more specific notion of
habit formation (see Section 3.2).
16I do not "dot" the realized consumptions for the sake of uniformity of (7) across time; the dotting
is implied by ID.
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at least consumption history and some other random events relevant to the agent’s
objective function must be resolved as history unfolds. The "rare" situation occurs
when some consumption subsequence is predetermined, and he is isolated from new
information. Perhaps the example closest to this situation is a prisoner serving in
isolation.17
Given the profession’s recognition of history dependence of preference, it is un-
clear as to why another "current" objective function that disregards history would
be artificially created. Presumably the logic is that since history is already realized,
it should play no role in a forward-looking agent’s objective function. But this rea-
soning exactly contradicts with the notion of history dependence of preference. For
instance, if the agent in period 0 cared about intertemporal substitution between
period-0 consumption c0 and future consumptions, then why is c0 forgotten in period
1? Conversely, if the agent in period 0 foresaw that he will disregard c0 in the next
period, why would he care about c0 now? Under the "current" objective function, the
agent does not only forget what happened before, he even forget that he has existed
before. Equivalently, he is assumed to be reborn at the beginning of every period.
We can perhaps step back and rethink about the issue at a conceptual level.
The constancy equivalence EUT framework is constructed axiomatically. Just as
the EUT axioms does not seem to necessarily lead to entangling of intertemporal
substitution and risk aversion, it does not appear that any of the axioms or the
constancy indiﬀerence assumption (or any combination of them) should result in
time inconsistency. And they do not.
In Section 2, the objective function is stated for period 0 only, which is the period
of birth. Now we are ready to define the general objective function that prevails
throughout the full-life. Suppose the agent is born in period 0 and will die in period
T , then his one and only one objective function is always
E [v(c) | ID] (8)
where ID is the set of all information available to the agent in the current period D
17If he is not jailed in isolation, then his information set will still change (e.g. through watching
news or meeting his visiting wife). Although he has no economic decision to make during his jail
term, he does have an objective function and hence preference.
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(between 0 and T ); and c is calculated on full-life basis, even though some consump-
tions may have already been determined:
U(c) = U(c)
where c ≡ {c}Tt=0 and c ≡ {c}Tt=0.
Epstein and Zin raise another concern on the Kihlstrom-Mirman type of objective
functions: If β < 1, then the dependence of preference on past consumption is greater
as the past becomes more distant. Now under the principle that the agent care about
full-life utility as a whole, it does not seem to be a problem. Actually, the very fact
that β < 1 exactly means earlier consumption are given heavier weights.18
4.3 Amnesia of Remaining-life Objective Functions
The remaining-life perspective sees the constancy equivalence EUT preference as in-
consistent only because the former imposes a priori assumption that agents keep for-
getting history, or alternatively, that agents are reborn in each period. On the other
hand, recursively defined objective functions by its very own nature automatically
guarantee fulfillment of Strotz’s notion of time consistency because the preference
in each period is made to be history independent. From the full-life perspective, it
is actually the remaining-life setting, which include all recursively defined objective
functions, that is incoherent. For example, consider Epstein-Zin’s recursively defined
objective function for period t with explicit functional form:
Ut =
h
(1− β) cγt + β
¡
EtUαt+1
¢γ/αi1/γ
where γ and α are parameters dictating the attitudes toward intertemporal substitu-
tion and risk aversion respectively. In period 0, c0 enters the objective function U0.
In period 1, however, c0 appears nowhere in the objective function U1. If the agent
cared about intertemporal substitution between c0 and future utility in period 0, why
18Moreover, the "discount" factor does not have to be less than one, even with the uncertainty of
T taken into consideration. If the agent is mortal, discounting is not necessary for obtaining finite
lifetime utility. There are also evidences for a negative time-discount rate. See, for example, Barsky
et. al. (1997) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).
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is c0 forgotten in period 1?
In fact, all objective functions that are defined only on the remaining-life, including
all recursive objective function, suﬀer from chronic amnesia in principle. However,
in some special cases, the ever changing remaining-life objective function happens
to be equivalent to the true full-life objective function. An obvious example is the
conventional specification. Strictly speaking, the conventional objective function in
say, period 1 should be
E1
"
u (c˙0) +
TX
t=1
βtu(ct)
#
But due to time separability, this "happens" to be equivalent to the familiar form:
E1
"
TX
t=1
βtu(ct)
#
The conventional specification is a convenient way to avoid the amnesia problem.
Unfortunately, it achieves that only at the expense of entangling intertemporal sub-
stitution and risk aversion. The constancy equivalence EUT objective function (8) is
not recursive, but this is inevitable because agents care about full-life consumption
as a whole.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a two-step approach to cleanly disentangle an agent’s attitudes
toward intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. The approach is based on the
concept of constancy equivalent. It is axiomatically constructed, flexible, indiﬀerent
to the timing of resolution of uncertainty, and intuitive to interpret. It can also be
extended to accommodate multiple goods. Another contribution of the paper is to
point out that to be consistent, an agent should have one and only one objective
function, determined at birth, that is defined on full-life. A recurring message is
that the agent cares about the full-life consumption sequence as a whole. Objective
functions defined on remaining-life only, including recursive objective functions, are
amnesiac because they keep forgetting history.
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Given the constancy equivalence EUT framework, the obvious step next is to
put the theory to test. The framework can be evaluated with respect to (1) its
disentangling performance, and (2) its assertion of full-life objective function. The
financial markets should serve as the ideal testing grounds. In particular, the equity
premium puzzle would be a key empirical issue to investigate.
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